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The Diplomatic History of the Civil War
Few subjects in U.S. diplomatic history have received more attention than
Union and Confederate relations with Great Britain during the Civil War.
Ephraim D. Adams, Richard J. M. Blackett, D. P. Crook, Norman B. Ferris,
Charles M. Hubbard, Brian Jenkins, Howard Jones, Dean B. Mahin and other
historians too numerous to name have engaged this matter in great depth. In
Caution and Cooperation, Phillip E. Myers draws upon extensive primary source
research in U.S., Canadian, and British repositories and an impressive grasp of
the work of his predecessors to probe anew Anglo-American relations during the
conflict. Most especially, Myers addresses the overriding question of the U.S.
South's failure to secure the recognition and aid it expected from Britain when it
risked war with the North by seceding in 1860-61.
Myers thoroughly covers the major issues that British, Union and
Confederate officials grappled with during the war, including Britain's neutrality
and recognition of Confederate belligerency, the Trent affair, disputes over the
Union's enforcement of its blockade and the construction of Confederate
commerce raiders in England, the recognition/mediation crisis of 1862, Canadian
complications, and the Union-British treaty to repress the African slave trade
(1862). Although Myers's focus is on Union-British negotiations, he devotes an
entire chapter to Confederate diplomacy.
Revisionist in tone, Caution and Cooperation challenges many popular 
beliefs about Civil War trans-Atlantic affairs. Myers argues, for example, that: 
(1) Britain's aristocracy was not pro-Confederate; (2) Britain's recognition of 
Confederate belligerency supported rather than threatened the Union cause; (3)
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Union Secretary of State William Seward was not a "loose cannon" during the
war's first months; (4) historian Russell Weigley is right in arguing that the Trent
affair was "'not so dangerous as both the American and British bluster made it
appear'"; (5) Britain would not have intervened in the war even if General Lee
had been victorious at Antietam; (6) Confederate plots on Canadian soil
improved rather than endangered Union-British relations; (7) there was "no
substance to [Charles] Sumner's postwar threats" (245) of revenge upon Britain
for helping the Confederacy if she failed to cede Canada to resolve the "Alabama
claims." However, Myers adheres to the common wisdom that Confederate
diplomacy stunk, one of the few conclusions in U.S. historiography apparently
immune to revisionism. Myers is particularly critical of Confederate efforts early
in the war to pressure Britain into intervention by withholding cotton from the
international market.
Most of these contentions have been articulated before in one scholarly
work or another. What makes Caution and Cooperation distinctive is the
sustained theme it presents and what might be called its packaging. Myers
sandwiches his account of Civil War diplomacy between chapters about
Anglo-American relations during antebellum and postbellum times. This allows
him to develop two major arguments that he reiterates throughout the work.
First, although Myers does not list Bradford Perkins's works on
Anglo-American rapprochements in his bibliography, he applies a Perkins-like
perspective to nineteenth-century Anglo-American relations by emphasizing the
commercial, strategic, cultural and ideological factors that bound the U.S./Union
and Britain together. Decades of antebellum "cooperation" by two powers
sharing an "antimartial spirit" (2) ensured that Britain would never intervene on
the Confederate side and that the Union would refrain from pushing wartime
disputes past the brink. Four years of Union-British cooperation during the
conflict guaranteed, in turn, that postwar disputes such as the Alabama claims,
Fenian raids, and the U.S.'s abrogation of the1854 Marcy-Elgin Reciprocity and
Fisheries Treaty" about U.S.-Canadian relations would not provoke a war. To
demonstrate his point, Myers traces in some detail how a joint U.S.-British
pursuit of informal empire in East Asia spanned most of the years his study
covers. It was unlikely that two powers cooperating in gunboat diplomacy and
trade policies in China and Japan would fight each other in the Atlantic or
Caribbean.
2
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol10/iss4/9
Second, Myers contends that the methods of Anglo-American diplomacy
were as important as its purposes. That is, British and U.S. leaders well before
the Civil War mastered the technique of enabling treaties through personal letters
and conversations (as in negotiations preceding the Webster-Ashburton, Oregon,
Clayton-Bulwer, and Canadian Reciprocity agreements), and Union and British
policy makers naturally continued this pattern of private diplomacy once the
fighting began. One of the most striking examples Myers provides of this pattern
is the anti-slave trade convention that Secretary Seward negotiated with Britain's
minister Lord Lyons in 1861-1862 without consulting other members of
Lincoln's cabinet. The agreement, one of the great triumphs of Lincoln's
diplomacy given that it passed the U.S. Senate unanimously despite a provision
allowing for Royal Navy searches and seizures of American vessels, appalled
Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. Welles resented Seward's
bypassing his colleagues and concluded that Seward had been "duped" (p. 213)
into a document detrimental to Union interests.
So committed to peaceful relations were British and U.S. leaders that when
they could not resolve disputes, they sensibly deferred them until conditions
were riper for settlement. This was the case before the war. The Oregon treaty of
1846, for example, left imprecise the boundary at Puget Sound between U.S. and
British territory. And the pattern continued during the war, with both British and
Union leaders demonstrating restraint in crisis after crisis, trusting that
conditions would eventually be conducive to resolution. The British, for
example, waited until after the Civil War ended for a U.S. Court to award almost
$68,000 to the owners of the Peterhoff, taken by U.S. Acting Rear Admiral
Charles Wilkes near St. Thomas in February 1863.
Myers attributes Anglo-Union cooperation in the Civil War to strong 
commercial bonds, a shared commitment to informal empire, Britain's need to 
preserve its military resources for potential application against the rising threats 
of France and Prussia and its unwillingness to risk U.S. attacks on the Canadian 
provinces, and other factors including, of course, the South's identification with 
slavery and Lincoln's conversion to emancipation. Myers's argument is 
compelling. For instance, he draws on Jay Sexton's Debtor Diplomacy (2005) to 
show that during the Trent crisis, British banking houses played a key role for 
peace by threatening to refuse loans to the Union so long as war seemed 
pending. But I suspect that given the way he presents his evidence, many readers 
will finish this book with the misleading impression that a third Anglo-American 
war was not only unthinkable between 1861 and 1865, but also for the entire
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nineteenth century after the War of 1812. Rabid Anglophobia and militarism,
however, ran deeper in the U.S. than Myers allows, and disputes such as Oregon
and the Trent affair had more potential to erupt in conflict than Myers's narrative
implies. Americans were not so much antiwar as averse to standing armies. They
constantly nominated and elected generals as presidents and were confident that
they could rapidly grow their military with volunteers if war came—as they did
successfully in the conflict with Mexico of 1846-1848. Myers construes what
might be called a pacific synthesis of Anglo-American relations by ignoring
Anglophobic "Young America" antebellum Democratic politicians such as
Lewis Cass and Stephen Douglas; his emphasis, rather, is upon U.S.-British
peacemakers like the Barings, Lord Aberdeen, and Daniel Webster. Myers's
surprising slip (252) respecting postwar diplomacy that President Grant saw to
Charles Sumner's dumping "as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for opposing the president's desire to annex Cuba" raises questions
about Myers's handling of the interplay between domestic politics and foreign
relations. The Grant-Sumner split over Grant's scheme to annex the Dominican
Republic is one of the best-known chapters of that general's presidency.
This book's strengths far overshadow its arguable weaknesses. I found
Caution and Cooperation extremely informative on the process of Union-British
negotiations and its chronology. Myers's depictions of key personalities, such as
Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer William E. Gladstone, are illuminating and
persuasive, and his plunge into the thicket of slave trade treaty negotiations and
blockade disputes is adept. On the one hand, Myers demonstrates, British leaders
refrained from challenging the Union blockade (even off neutral ports where
according to international law they would have had cause to do so), refrained
from threatening protests when the Union actually seized British vessels, barred
blockade-runners from docking at Bermuda for repair work, and detained the
Laird rams rather than allow them to steam for the Confederacy. On the other
hand, the Lincoln administration bent to British sensitivities by returning
captured British mailbags, appeasing British opinion by transferring its
combative admiral Charles Wilkes to the Pacific, supporting U.S. prize courts
releasing captured British blockade-runners, and purposely allowing leaks in its
own blockade so that some Confederate cotton could reach England, partially
relieving the depression in the British textile industry.
Caution & Cooperation makes an important contribution to the
historiography of the Civil War and U.S. diplomacy. Its holistic approach to
U.S.-British relations is thought-provoking and rewarding.
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Robert E. May, Professor of History at Purdue University, is the author of
books and articles on U.S. diplomatic history. He is also the editor of a
collection of essays on Civil War diplomacy, The Union, the Confederacy, and
the Atlantic Rim (paper ed.; Purdue University Press, 1995).
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